










This Article considers whether and how originalism promotes the Constitution’s 
democratic legitimacy, in theory and in practice.  In the late twentieth century, 
critics of the Warren and Burger courts argued that judicial review lacks 
democratic authority when judges depart from the original understanding of those 
who ratified the Constitution.  Originalism’s critics objected that giving past generations 
this kind of control over the living would vitiate the Constitution’s democratic 
authority.  Initially, originalism’s theorists belittled this objection to dead hand control; 
recently, originalists have developed varied and sophisticated responses to it.  But 
these responses generally tend to qualify originalism’s claims to democratic 
legitimacy or to weaken the originalist character of the interpretive method they set 
out to defend. 
The dead hand objection may trouble originalism in theory, but it poses far less 
of a problem in practice.  To show why, the Article examines originalist interpretation 
in Heller v. District of Columbia.  While Heller purports to enforce the decisions of 
eighteenth-century Americans, this Article identifies several forms of internal 
evidence that suggest the opinion is enforcing the beliefs of Americans living long after 
the Constitution’s ratification.  This evidence, considered alone or with the social 
movement history of Heller that I have elsewhere examined, shows how originalism 
can enforce the constitutional convictions of living Americans.  In practice, 
originalism appears to be a species of popular constitutionalism. 
If originalism does not enforce dead hand control, what role might constitutional 
history play in constitutional interpretation?  To explore this question, the Article 
compares the role of historical argument in Heller and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1—a recent equal 
protection decision in which conservative and liberal justices fought over Brown and 
the post-ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As appeals to pre- and 
post-ratification history in these cases illustrate, history constrains as it channels 
debate.  Appeals to the collective memory of past constitutional settlements enable 
Americans of very different normative views to make authoritative claims about 
who we are and what we owe one another. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution speaks in the name of “We, the People.”  
It is widely understood to have democratic, as well as rule of law, authority.  
This Article considers how originalism sustains the Constitution’s democratic 
authority, in theory and practice.  It examines the debates over “dead” and 
“living” constitutionalism1 in light of the Court’s originalist interpretation of 
the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller,2 and concludes with 
reflections on the role that historical evidence plays in enabling community 
in disagreement. 
Those who mobilized in support of originalism in the late twentieth 
century3 asserted that ratification was the source of the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                            
 1. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. 
L. REV. 693, 693 (1976) (“At first blush it seems certain that a living Constitution is better than what 
must be its counterpart, a dead Constitution.  It would seem that only a necrophile could disagree.”). 
 2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 3. The claim that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of understandings that 
prevailed at the time of its ratification has been asserted in many different times and contexts.  The 
term originalism is of more recent origin, first coined in 1979 by Paul Brest as an account of such 
claims.  See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 
204 (1980).  This Article locates debates over jurisprudence in historical and political context, and 
uses the term originalism to describe the claims of the movement to which Brest was responding. 
In this Article, originalism refers to claims about constitutional interpretation advanced in 
criticism of decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts by Americans mobilized in constitutional 
politics in the late twentieth century.  See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 215–26 (2008) (documenting how originalism 
gave jurisprudential expression to the coalition politics of the New Right); see also JOHNATHAN 
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 94–110, 146–60 (2005) (discussing the 
idea of originalism in post-Warren Court politics and jurisprudence).  The Article refers to Americans who 
participated in this late-twentieth-century constitutional mobilization against decisions of the 
Warren and Burger Courts as first-generation originalists.  For example, first-generation originalists 
contended that enforcing the original understanding was the only legitimate way to interpret the 
Constitution.  See infra note 20 and accompanying text.  This is a constraint that many of their 
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democratic authority, and contended that the procedures for amending the 
Constitution set forth in Article V were the only democratically legitimate 
method of changing the Constitution.4  This provided first-generation 
originalists a rhetorically powerful basis for criticizing Warren and Burger 
Court decisions as democratically illegitimate modes of updating the 
Constitution, but simultaneously opened the theory of originalism to the charge 
that originalism itself led to a democratically illegitimate understanding of the 
Constitution.  As originalism’s jurisprudential critics have emphasized for 
decades now, the constitutional order that the theory of originalism produces 
is plagued by problems of dead hand control that vitiate its democratic 
authority: “We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead 
and gone.”5  Second-generation originalists who attempted seriously to 
grapple with the dead hand problem in the 1990s qualified originalism’s 
claim to democratic authority, or proposed modifications in the practice 
of originalist interpretation that dilute its methodological character as 
originalist interpretation.6 
If originalism interprets the Constitution in ways that privilege the 
democratic voice of the dead over the living, what accounts for originalism’s 
late twentieth-century popularity?  This seeming paradox dissolves if we look 
outside the theory of originalism to the practice of originalism.  As I have 
elsewhere argued, the conservative movement’s demands for restoring the 
original understanding of the Constitution co-joined a jurisprudence and a 
politics,7 allowing originalism to function, as Robert Post and I describe, as 
conservatives’ living constitution.8 
                                                                                                                            
successors—whom I term second-generation originalists—have relaxed.  See infra notes 44–56 and 
accompanying text. 
Keith Whittington also analyzes the development of originalism with attention to the political 
engagements of its proponents.  See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 601 (2004) (conceding that originalism’s initial expositors were more interested in 
criticizing the decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts than in elaborating the theoretical 
premises of their criticisms; describing the rise of a “new originalism” as conservatives gained control 
of the federal judiciary and needed to develop a theory to justify the exercise of judicial power, and 
not merely to criticize it).  
 4. See infra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 5. Brest, supra note 3, at 225.  For a recent discussion, see Richard A. Primus, When Should 
Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 192 & n.104 (2008). 
 6. See infra text at notes 44–56. 
 7. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1347 (2006) (“Justice Scalia and other 
avatars of the Reagan revolution regularly employ the language of originalism to exhort Americans to 
mobilize against the Court and seek constitutional change without the intermediation of constitutional 
lawmaking.  Originalism, in other words, is not merely a jurisprudence.  It is a discourse employed in 
politics to mount an attack on courts.  Since the 1970s, originalism’s proponents have deployed the 
law/politics distinction and the language of constitutional restoration in the service of constitutional 
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My recent Comment on District of Columbia v. Heller9 contextualizes the 
decision’s originalist reading of the Second Amendment in twentieth-century 
constitutional politics.10  It offers an historical account of how originalism 
gave jurisprudential expression to the coalition politics of the New Right,11 
and documents how processes of mobilization, countermobilization, coa-
lition, and compromise shaped the justification and reach of the right Heller 
recognizes.12  The Heller Court claims that in striking down the District of 
Columbia’s handgun ban, it is merely enforcing a decision made by 
eighteenth-century Americans.13  Yet, whatever its vices, Heller does not 
impose the decisions of the dead on the living.  The decision arises out of a 
quite contemporary and still persisting dispute about the nature and scope of 
our constitutional freedoms—as any politically aware reader of the decision 
understands.  Cass Sunstein observes that Heller’s originalism “has everything 
to do with the particular context in which the Heller Court wrote—the context 
that led the Court to be composed as it was and to have the inclinations that it 
did.”14  J. Harvie Wilkinson is more blunt: “Heller encourages Americans to do 
what conservative jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the 
ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts.”15 
If constitutional history does not impose dead hand control, what role 
does historical evidence play in a case like Heller?  Reading Heller with 
attention to the politics as well as the jurisprudence of originalism, we can see 
that constitutional history plays an important role in structuring constitutional 
disputes that history cannot settle.  Members of the political community share 
fidelity to the memory of the nation’s founding and subsequent history, and 
                                                                                                                            
change—so successfully that, without Article V lawmaking, what was once the language of a 
constitutional insurgency is now the language of the constitutional establishment.”). 
 8. See Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic 
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2009) (analyzing originalism through the lens of democratic constitutionalism).  For another account 
of the ways originalism derives authority from contemporary popular convictions, see Jamal Greene, 
Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
 9. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 10. See Siegel, supra note 3. 
 11. Id. at 216–23. 
 12. Id. at 201–36. 
 13. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 14. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
246, 252 (2008).  The day after Heller was decided, Dave Kopel, Associate Policy Analyst for the 
Cato Institute and one of three lawyers who assisted Alan Gura, the attorney for Mr. Heller, at oral 
argument, made much the same point.  See infra text accompanying note 93. 
 15. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 254 (2009). 
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appeal to this collective memory in disputes about the Constitution’s meaning.  
Debate over the Second Amendment’s ratification history in Heller functions 
like the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment’s post-ratification history in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 116—a 
widely anticipated end-of-term case in which the Court divided along 
similar lines only the year before.  Appeal to the authority of a shared past 
anchors relationship among those in conflict, and so plays an important role 
in sustaining a normatively heterogeneous political community. 
In the domain of constitutional theory, the obligation to reason from 
history is said to subject the living to the dead hand of the past, and to 
constrain constitutional interpreters from enforcing their own normative 
views; in practice, however, historical evidence seems to play a very different 
role.  The living advocate their normative views by appeal to historical 
narratives the community shares, and through these practices of constitutional 
dispute sustain community in disagreement. 
I. ORIGINALISM’S DEAD HAND PROBLEM, IN THEORY 
There is not one theory of originalism, but many.17  That said, originalist 
theories commonly locate the Constitution’s democratic authority in the 
consent of the ratifying generations, leading one scholar to characterize 
originalism as a form of “consent-based positivism.”18  Advocates of originalism 
in the 1970s and 1980s viewed consent as playing a crucial role in fixing the 
Constitution’s meaning.19  They argued that the Constitution should only be 
                                                                                                                            
 16. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 17. For some recent accounts of the dimensions in which theories of originalism differ, see 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J.  (forthcoming Nov. 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090282. 
 18. James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991).  But see Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
111, 117 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional legitimacy has not been conferred by either the individual or the 
collective consent of ‘We the People.’”). 
 19. See Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5, 8 (1988) (Constitutions “confer democratic legitimacy by formally expressing the consent of 
the people to the government’s exercises of authority.”).  Judicial review, if “guided by text and 
original meaning, . . . validates the consent of the governed.”  Id. at 10.  See generally Gardner, supra 
note 18, at 7–8 (“The Constitution is the vehicle by which the people consent to the creation of a 
government and spell out its various powers and the limitations on those powers.”) (citing RAOUL BERGER, 
DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBSTACLE COURSE 66 (1982); RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
passim (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY], Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2, 3 (1971); Edwin Meese, Construing the Constitution, 
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interpreted as it was understood at the time of its ratification,20 and 
contended that the only legitimate way to change the Constitution was by 
the amending process provided by those whose consent made the instrument 
binding.21  This claim that the original understanding was the only legiti-
mate basis for interpreting the Constitution supplied first-generation 
originalists a basis for attacking interpretive methods employed by the 
Warren and Burger Courts.22  And it was this claim in turn that provoked the 
rejoinder that, as Michael Moore put it, “The dead hand of the past ought not to 
govern, . . . and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a 
bad theory.”23 
Originalism’s critics objected that interpreting the Constitution in 
accordance with originalist methods would undermine the Constitution’s 
democratic legitimacy.24  The problem was clear enough.  It has been hundreds 
                                                                                                                            
19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 23–24, 26 (1985); Edwin Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5–6, 8, 9 (1988)). 
 20. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION 3 (1988) (“[C]onstitutional language should be construed as it was publicly understood 
at the time of its drafting and ratification and government attorneys should advance constitutional 
arguments based only on this ‘original meaning.’  To do this, government attorneys should attempt to 
construct arguments based solely on the ordinary usage of the words at the time the provision at issue 
was ratified.”);  see DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINALISM 139 (2005) (identifying the defining claim of originalism as the claim that “original 
understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any contrary understanding of that text in 
succeeding generations”); see also Berman, supra note 17 (discussing originalists asserting the exclusive 
authority of originalism). 
 21. BERGER, supra note 19, at 363–64, 386 (“The sole and exclusive vehicle of change the 
Framers provided was the amendment process . . . .”); see also infra note 38 and accompanying text 
(quoting Justice Antonin Scalia).  Originalists shifted ground on this point, once they began to 
exercise power in the Executive Branch and through judicial appointments.   
Although proponents of original intent insisted that the Constitution could only be 
changed through Article V amendment, the director of the Center for Judicial Studies, 
James McClellan, penned editorials advising conservatives to “kick the habit” of relying on 
Article V to overturn Supreme Court decisions; the strategy had repeatedly failed in the 
1960s and 1970s and tended instead to legitimate the Court.  “[T]here is something 
fundamentally wrong with our system if we are driven to amend the Constitution so as to 
restore its original meaning,” McClellan advised, criticizing the Reagan Administration’s 
“Prayer Amendment” and pointing out that conservatives would better achieve their aims 
by selectively restricting the Court’s jurisdiction or filing amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases. 
Siegel, supra note 3, at 219 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also id. at 219–23 (discussing efforts 
of the Reagan administration to institutionalize originalism through litigation and judicial appointments). 
 22. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 221–23 (locating the jurisprudence of originalism in the 
coalition politics of the New Right and discussing the specific lines of cases originalists challenged as 
identified by The Constitution in the Year 2000 publication of the Reagan Office of Legal Policy). 
 23. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 357 (1985). 
 24. For contemporary statements of this objection, see supra note 3 and accompanying text; 
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1099 
(1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
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of years since the Constitution was ratified.  No one alive today participated 
in the ratification process.  The cumbersome supermajority rules of Article V 
make amending the Constitution so much more difficult than other forms of 
legislative change that, since ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution 
has been amended less than twenty times.25  The living have not assented to 
Article V as the sole method of constitutional change.  And if we are to construe 
the living as having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding 
or arrangement, it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its 
many pathways of change.26 
In retrospect, it is remarkable how little first-generation originalists had to 
say in response to the dead hand objection.  Raoul Berger simply equated the 
Constitution with its framers, whom he seemed to view as having paternal authority: 
It does not dispose of the uncomfortable historical facts to be told that 
“the dead hand of the past need not and should not be binding,” that the 
Founders “should not rule us from their graves.”  To thrust aside the dead 
hand of the Framers is to thrust aside the Constitution.  The argument that 
new meanings may be given to words employed by the Framers aborts 
their design; it reduces the Constitution to an empty shell into which each 
shifting judicial majority pours its own preferences.27 
Henry Monaghan asserted that “original intent” governed the meaning of the 
Constitution’s text,28 and claimed that it was an “incontestable first principle” 
of American constitutional law that the Constitution’s text was “authori-
tative . . . for [all] successor generations.”29  In short, Berger and Monaghan 
disposed of the dead hand objection axiomatically. 
                                                                                                                            
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 288 & n.309 (1988); see also William J. Brennan, 
Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986). 
 25. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 35 (2004) (describing 
the Constitution as “practically unamendable”). 
 26. See Brest, supra note 3, at 225 (“[I]t is only through a history of continuing assent or 
acquiescence that the document could become law.  Our constitutional tradition, however, has 
not focused on the document alone, but on the decisions and practices of courts and other 
institutions. . . . [T]he practice of supplementing and derogating from the text and original 
understanding is itself part of our constitutional tradition.”). 
 27. BERGER, supra note 21, at 314–15 (emphasis added); cf. Rehnquist, supra  note 1 at 693 
(“At first blush it seems certain that a living Constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, 
a dead Constitution.  It would seem that only a necrophile could disagree.”). 
 28. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360 (1981).  
Monaghan employed “constitutional text” synonymously with original intent, writing that “a 
distinction is sometimes posited between textual analysis and original intent inquiry such that only 
the constitutional text and not ‘parol evidence’ can be examined to ascertain constitutional meaning.  
But any such distinction seems to be entirely wrong.”  Id. at 374. 
 29. Id. at 383: 
Why, [Professor Brest] asks, should the constitutional text be authoritative at all for successor 
generations? . . . The authoritative status of the written constitution is a legitimate matter 
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Even when Raoul Berger confronted the question of dead hand control, 
he was quick to dismiss it by invoking Article V: “Of course the dead cannot 
bind us; nor did they seek to do so.  Instead, the Framers provided us with an 
instrument of change—amendment pursuant to Article V.”30  Berger scoffed 
at objections that the Article V procedure made the Constitution terribly 
difficult to amend.31  Nor did he offer any consent-based reason why living 
Americans were obliged exclusively to rely on it.  Robert Bork was equally 
dismissive of dead hand objections, as if they raised no significant problem for 
originalism as a theory: 
[W]ith respect to the individual rights amendments we are not governed 
by our dead and unrepresentative Founders unless we wish to cut back 
or eliminate the freedoms they specified and to do so by simple legislative 
majorities. . . . The dead, and unrepresentative, men who enacted our 
Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments did not thereby forbid 
us, the living, to add new freedoms.  We remain entirely free to create all 
the additional freedoms we want by constitutional amendment or by 
simple legislation, and the nation has done so frequently.32 
Bork’s focus on the power of the living to legislate pointed to a different 
ground of rejoinder, based on a conviction that first-generation originalists 
shared.  First-generation originalists believed that originalism would promote 
democratic values indirectly, by disciplining judicial interpretation and thus 
limiting the reach of constitutional law.33  Whereas the argument from consent 
presupposed the continuing identification of current generations with the 
                                                                                                                            
of debate for political theorists interested in the nature of political obligation.  That status 
is, however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American constitutional 
law.  That I cannot otherwise “prove” the constitutional text to be the first principle is a 
necessary outcome of my first principle itself. 
 30. Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981). 
 31. Id. at 24. 
 32. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 170–71 (1990). 
 33. Whittington, supra note 3, at 602: 
First, originalism was thought to limit the discretion of the judge. . . . By rooting 
judges in the firm ground of text, history, well-accepted historical traditions, and the like, 
originalists hoped to discipline them.  The “political seduction of the law” was a constant 
threat in a system that armed judges with the powerful weapon of judicial review, and the 
best response to that threat was to lash judges to the solid mast of history. 
Second, originalism was married to a requirement of judicial deference to legislative 
majorities.  Bork admitted that originalism would require that “broad areas of constitutional 
law . . . be reformulated,” but what he has in mind was that the Court get out the way of 
legislative majorities in the many areas “where the Constitution does not speak.”  The originalist 
Constitution, as these writers imagined it, was primarily concerned with empowering 
popular majorities. 
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past,34 originalists just as frequently depicted the judge who enforced the 
original understanding as reasoning from impersonal principle and 
celebrated this rule-of-law restraint because it preserved the domain of 
legislative action.  “When a judge finds his principle in the Constitution 
as originally understood, the problem of the neutral derivation of principle 
is solved,” Bork reasoned.  “The judge accepts the ratifiers’ definition of the 
appropriate ranges of majority and minority freedom,” but if a judge makes 
“unguided value judgments of his own,” “he violates . . . the rights of the 
legislature and the people.”35  Lino Graglia explained: 
[T]he democratic principle that originalism seeks to protect is usually 
upheld, not threatened, when a court declines to intervene in the political 
process.  The Supreme Court serves the concept of a living Constitution 
less by acting than by getting out of the way, as in its post-1937 refusal 
to enforce federalism limitations on national power.36 
Frank Easterbrook subsequently expressed the point: “Democracy by the 
living is not an alternative to originalism and the rule of the dead; these are 
two aspects of the same thing, and an emphasis on ‘the dead’ when it comes 
to judges is essential to the power of ‘the living’ when it comes to 
governance.”37  Antonin Scalia’s argument for originalism seems to share these 
convictions, as it emphasizes the need for judicial restraint over the need for 
constitutional self-government: 
At an even more general theoretical level, originalism seems to me 
more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a 
democratic system.  A democratic society does not, by and large, need 
constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect “current values.”  
Elections take care of that quite well.  The purpose of constitutional 
guarantees—and in particular those constitutional guarantees of individual 
rights that are at the center of this controversy—is precisely to prevent the 
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society 
adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable.38 
                                                                                                                            
 34. See, e.g., Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 
32, 29 (1990) (observing how “[h]istorical interpretation” of the Constitution that “focuses on an 
original act of consent” relies on “a claimed continuity of identification with those who had proposed 
and ratified the” Constitution). 
 35. BORK, supra note 32, at 146–47. 
 36. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 
1031 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1123 
(1998); cf. All Things Considered: Scalia Vigorously Defends a ‘Dead’ Constitution (National Public Radio 
broadcast Apr. 28, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526. 
 38. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (first 
emphasis added). 
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In his many speeches calling for a “dead constitution” Justice Scalia has since 
argued repeatedly that theories of a living constitution leave judges free to 
impose their values, while only originalism can restrain judges.39 
In the end, first-generation originalists seem to concede that interpreting 
the Constitution in accordance with originalist methods denies the living the 
opportunity to express their distinctive constitutional understandings, but 
contend that the use of originalist methods will limit the reach of judicial 
review and so enlarge the domain of democratic self-government.  The 
writings of first-generation originalists typically assert originalism’s superior 
power to constrain judges as a matter of faith, without bothering to substantiate 
the point.40 
In the 1990s, after conservatives achieved dominance in the federal 
judiciary, a group of academics (and academics turned judges) set out to 
elaborate the theory of originalism.  These second-generation originalists were 
a more normatively heterogeneous group with different professional aims, and, in 
the quest to develop a theoretically satisfying account of originalism, engaged 
in a more sustained way with the dead hand objection. 
Some second-generation originalists, such as Randy Barnett, frankly 
acknowledge that originalism’s authority is not grounded in actual consent: 
[C]onstitutional legitimacy has not been conferred by either the individ-
ual or the collective consent of “We the People.” . . . Though genuine 
consent, were it to exist, could give rise to a duty of obedience, the 
conditions necessary for “We the People” actually to consent to anything 
like the Constitution or amendments thereto have never existed and 
could never exist.41 
Barnett concludes the Constitution’s legitimacy must flow from the justice 
of the political community it establishes.42  John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport make the case for originalism on consequentialist grounds, 
arguing that the supermajoritarian ratification procedures by which the 
                                                                                                                            
 39. See, e.g., Mark Morris, Scalia Criticizes “Living Constitution,” KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 5, 
2008, at B5; Brian Whitson, Justice Antonin Scalia: The Case for a “Dead Constitution,” W&M NEWS, 
Mar. 21, 2004, http://web.wm.edu/news/archive/index.php?id=3486. 
 40. See Whittington, supra note 3, at 602.  Part II of this Article considers this claim of 
originalist theory through an example of originalist practice in the Heller decision.  For a more wide 
ranging survey, see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE 
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM (2004) (tracing the emergence of conservative 
activism on the Rehnquist Court). 
 41. Barnett, supra note 18, at 117. 
 42. See id. at 113; Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 16–19 (2006). 
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Constitution was adopted are more likely than anything else to pro-
duce independently legitimate outcomes.43 
There are now several second-generation originalists who have 
attempted to address the dead hand problem, and have forged methods of 
interpretation better suited to sustain the Constitution’s authority across 
generations.  These second-generation originalists abandon the first-generation 
claim that originalism is the only legitimate mode of interpreting the 
Constitution, and propose innovations in interpretive method that would 
give voice to the understandings of those who lived under the Constitution, 
sometimes elevating their views over those held by the ratifying generation. 
The most commonplace way in which first-generation originalists 
acknowledge accommodating the beliefs of the living is through the practice of 
stare decisis,44 understood as a pragmatic concession to the errors of others: 
“[S]tare decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy,” Justice Scalia 
emphasizes, “it is a pragmatic exception to it.”45  (Deferring to non-originalist 
precedent dilutes originalism and makes it a nakedly discretionary practice,46 
yet Justice Scalia embraces stare decisis with much greater frequency than 
Justice Thomas, explaining, “I am a textualist.  I am an originalist.  I am not a 
nut.”47)  By contrast, Michael McConnell acknowledges, as a matter of 
                                                                                                                            
 43. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (defending originalism “by reference to the likely consequences flowing 
from the process” that adopted the Constitution, not because that process is a source of legitimacy). 
 44. See Scalia, supra note 38, at 861 (“I can be much more brief in describing what seems to 
me the second most serious objection to originalism: In its undiluted form, at least, it is medicine that 
seems too strong to swallow.  Thus, almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of 
stare decisis.”). 
 45. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). 
 46. See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1755 n.42 (2007) (“Justice Scalia has famously described himself as a ‘faint-
hearted originalist,’ who uses the doctrine of stare decisis as a pragmatic device to restrain an all-out 
assault on the twentieth century. . . . Justice Scalia recognizes the ‘pragmatic’ character of his 
approach, but despite his famous denunciation of discretionary judgments in constitutional law, he 
creates a gaping exception when it comes to deciding when constitutional truth is more or less 
important than constitutional stability.”) (citations omitted). 
 47. A recent National Public Radio interview with Justice Scalia reports: 
 “You can't reinvent the wheel. You've got to accept the vast majority of prior 
decisions. . . . I do not argue that all of the mistakes made in the name of the so-called 
living constitution be ripped out.  I just say, ‘Let's cut it out.  Go back to the good, old dead 
Constitution,’” Scalia says. 
 This attitude puts him in a decidedly different camp than fellow conservative Justice 
Clarence Thomas, who Scalia concedes is far more willing to reverse past precedent. 
 “I am a textualist.  I am an originalist. I am not a nut,” he says, underscoring that he 
generally doesn't favor undoing old rulings. He also notes that the idea of a living constitution 
places no restraints on judges. 
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principle and not merely pragmatism, that constitutional interpretation needs 
to take into account the constitutional understandings of Americans who live 
after the founding, whom he claims “also ‘ratified’ the Constitution.”48  
McConnell reasons that judges should temper originalism with 
“traditionalism,” which he defines as interpreting the Constitution in light of 
“the long-standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the 
nation”49 and which he associates with Washington v. Glucksberg.50 
In contrast to McConnell’s prescription that judges combine originalism 
with traditionalism and restraint, Keith Whittington develops an answer to 
originalism’s dead hand problem that focuses on practices of “consti-
                                                                                                                            
All Things Considered, supra note 37; see also Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their 
Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 201 n.156 (2007) (“Justice Scalia has said that 
Justice Thomas ‘doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period. . . . [I]f a constitutional line of authority is 
wrong, [Thomas] would say ‘Let’s get it right.’  I wouldn’t do that.”) (quoting Stephen B. Presser, 
Touting Thomas, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 68, 68–69, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/ 
issues/January-February-2005/review_presser_janfeb05.msp). 
 48. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1133 (1998). 
 49. Id.  McConnell writes: 
This approach to the dead hand problem suggests a mode of constitutional interpretation 
that gives weight not only to constitutional principles as they were conceived at the 
founding, but also to those principles as they have been conceived by successive generations 
of Americans in the years since the founding.  Those subsequent generations of Americans 
also “ratified” the Constitution, and their understandings should also count.  In practical 
terms, that means the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the long-
standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation.  I refer to this 
constitutional methodology as “traditionalism.” 
Id. In addition to considering the views of post-ratification generations through the principle of 
traditionalism, McConnell argues that a constitutional judge should also exercise restraint vis-a-vis 
the decisions of present-day majorities.  In combining originalism with traditionalism and restraint, a 
judge helps the nation in its “struggle to lay down temporally extended commitments and to honor 
those commitments over time.”  Id. at 1135 (quoting Jed Rubenfield, The Moment and the Millenium, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1105 (1998)).  Such is the essence of self-rule and, consequently the 
nature of the Constitution’s democratic authority, if we, as McConnell argues we should, understand 
ourselves as part of “a historically continuous community.”  Id. at 1134.  McConnell thus “solves” the 
dead hand problem by temporally expanding the conception of the “self” that democracy aspires to 
let rule.  In so doing, however, McConnell imbues the constitutional judge’s task with a significant 
amount of discretion and, moreover, requires that she place significant weight on considerations 
other than the understandings of the Constitution at the time of its ratification. 
See also Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH 
L. REV. 665, 684 (“The voice of tradition is thus the voice of humility: the assumption that when 
many people, over a period of many years, have come to a particular conclusion, this is more reliable 
than the attempt of any one person (even oneself) or small group of persons (such as the Court) to 
chart a new course on the basis of abstract first principles.”) [hereinafter McConnell, Right to Die]; id. 
at 686 (“A jurisprudence grounded in text and tradition is not hostile to social change, but it assigns 
the responsibility to determine the pace and direction of change to representative bodies.”). 
 50. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see id. at 710, 711 (interpreting the Due Process Clause “by 
examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices” and considering “over 700 years [of] 
the Anglo-American common-law tradition.”); McConnell, Right to Die supra note 49, at 681. 
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tutional construction” by the representative branches of government.  
Constitutional construction might be understood as a second-generation 
originalist’s account of the democratic politics that originalism enables—an 
account informed by the theories of departmentalism developed in the 
Reagan Justice Department.51  Whittington understands politics as a domain 
of principle as well as preference; it is a domain in which nonjudicial actors 
make claims on the Constitution.  Whittington observes that “[p]olitics is not 
only constrained externally by the judiciary but also internally by the political 
operation of constitutional understandings,”52 and suggests that the representa-
tive branches of government construct the Constitution’s meaning in cases 
where its judicially enforceable original meaning is exhausted or indeterminate:  
[T]he alternatives are not between a living constitutionalism sustained 
by a flexible interpretive method and an inflexible constitutionalism 
imposed by an interpretive method emphasizing the past.  Rather, the 
choice is between two forms of living constitutionalism: one imposed 
by the judiciary on the political branches, and one created and 
sustained by electoral politics itself.53 
Jack Balkin continues to expand originalism, even beyond the 
framework that Whittington contemplates.  To meet dead hand concerns, 
Balkin argues that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of its 
original public meaning, proposing a method of text and principle to enforce 
the Constitution’s general provisions that liberates interpretation of these 
provisions from the founders’ expected applications.54  No longer is originalist 
                                                                                                                            
 51. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions: 
The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981–89 (1987) (contending that there is a 
distinction between “constitutional law,” or judicial interpretations of the Constitution binding only 
on the courts and parties before them, and “the Constitution,” which all branches of government are 
charged to apply and interpret); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 225–26 (1994) (arguing for departmentalism on 
originalist grounds). 
 52. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 205 (1999). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
427, 434–36 (2007); see id. at 448–49 (footnotes omitted): 
[T]he turn to original meaning was not designed to drive a wedge between the text’s public 
meaning and how the framing generation would have expected the text would be 
applied. . . . . 
 . . . [Yet] Ronald Dworkin, Randy Barnett, Mark Greenberg, and Harry Litman have 
pointed out that the move to original meaning had an unintended consequence.  Fidelity to 
original meaning did not require following what the framing generation thought the 
consequences of adopting the words would be. . . . Once we understand the logical consequences 
of moving from original intention and original understanding to original meaning, we see that 
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interpretation constrained, as even Whittington claims.  Balkin embraces 
Whittington’s concept of construction as a practice in which all three 
branches of government engage.55  In short, Balkin openly embraces originalism 
as a practice of living constitutionalism.  He rejects the first-generation 
understanding of originalism as an interpretive method designed to constrain 
judges, and replaces it with an understanding of the Constitution as a 
delegation to future generations.  In his version of originalism, the Constitution’s 
meaning ranges as widely as the imagination of the Americans who mobilize 
to make claims on it.56 
As this brief survey of originalism’s response to the dead hand problem 
suggests, first-generation originalist theories offered no constitutional remedy 
for the dead hand problem other than the method’s promise of judicial 
restraint, while second-generation originalist theories that have seriously 
addressed the dead hand question have responded in ways that transform the 
normative basis and interpretive practice of originalism in nontrivial ways.  
Second-generation originalist theories that engage with the problem of dead 
hand control recognize the authority of precedent, tradition, construction, 
and other forms of living constitutionalism, and as they incorporate these 
understandings and practices, lose many of their distinctive methodological 
constraints as originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. 
II. HELLER, ORIGINALISM’S DEAD HAND IN PRACTICE 
Justice Scalia’s recent decision for the Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller57 proudly offers itself as an exemplar of originalist reasoning, and was 
immediately greeted as such.58  In Heller, the Court struck down a gun control 
                                                                                                                            
original meaning originalism—or at least the version I offer here—is actually a form of 
living constitutionalism. 
 55. Id. at 435. 
 56. Id. at 464: 
The method of text and principle, I believe, serves the multiple functions of a 
constitution—as basic law, higher law, and our law—far better than other forms of 
originalism.  An originalism that strongly distrusts delegation to future generations and 
demands that open-ended provisions must be closely connected to original expected 
application is defective in all three respects. 
 57. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 58. See Linda Greenhouse, SIDEBAR: 3 Defining Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK 
4; see also Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 
2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original public 
meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Posting of Dale Carpenter to The 
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_06_22-2008_06_28.shtml#1214599824  
(June 27, 2008, 16:50 EST), (“[T]he fact that . . . every justice on the Court, in this rare and pristine 
constitutional moment, grasped for originalism as at least a cover for their views indicates that something 
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law as violating the Second Amendment, for the first time in the Second 
Amendment’s history.  The Court presented this new understanding of the 
Second Amendment as the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment59 and attributed to those who ratified the Second Amendment 
the decision to invalidate the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban: 
The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of 
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting 
upon.  A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments 
of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.  Constitutional 
rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have 
when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or 
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.60 
But the Heller Court sharply divided on the question whether those who 
ratified the Second Amendment prohibited hand gun bans such as the 
District of Columbia’s.  The dissenters asserted that the Second Amendment 
was ratified for the republican purposes set forth in the Amendment’s first 
clause—to prevent the federal government from disbanding the state 
militias—and thus protects only “a right to use and possess arms in conjunc-
tion with service in a well-regulated militia,”61 and not “the right to possess 
and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense.”62  
The majority, however, read the Second Amendment to preserve the militia 
by codifying the common law right of self-defense, and declared that the 
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”63 
In Heller, we confront a practical illustration of dead hand control; or 
rather, we would confront such a case, if, as Justice Scalia insists, the decision 
to prohibit the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban was made by the Second 
Amendment’s eighteenth-century ratifiers.  If, on the other hand, the decision 
to prohibit the hand gun ban was attributed to the Amendment’s ratifiers by 
                                                                                                                            
more profound has happened in our constitutional culture.”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Finds 
History Is a Matter of Opinions, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at A14 (“This year the Supreme Court 
relied more than ever on history and the original meaning of the Constitution in deciding its major 
cases.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Analysis of Heller, Legal Theory Blog (June 26, 2008), http://lsolum. 
typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/06/analysis-of-hel.html (“It is difficult to imagine a clearer or more 
thoroughgoing endorsement of original public meaning originalism.”). 
 59. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2805. 
 60. See id. at 2821 (denouncing an interest-balancing test proposed by Justice Breyer). 
 61. Id. at 2831(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 2822. 
 63. Id. at 2821; 2801 (majority  opinion) (“[T]he Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces 
the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent the elimination of the militia.”). 
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its twenty-first-century enforcers, we would instead find ourselves facing 
originalism’s answer to the dead hand problem: an originalist practice of 
living constitutionalism. 
In my recent Comment on the decision, I read Heller as enforcing 
understandings forged in popular constitutionalism.64  My views about Heller’s 
animating logic are not idiosyncratic.  Commentators across the spectrum, 
from Jack Balkin, Sandy Levinson, and Cass Sunstein to Richard Posner and 
J. Harvie Wilkinson have remarked on the political energies fueling Heller’s 
originalism.65 
In what follows, I reprise several points from a much longer account of 
the ways Heller’s originalism enforces understandings forged in popular 
constitutionalism.  I focus first on the reasoning of the decision itself, and 
then situate the decision in political context. 
                                                                                                                            
 64. See Siegel, supra note 3.  For theoretical accounts of originalism as conservatives’ living 
constitution, see sources cited supra note 9. 
 65. For Sunstein’s and Wilkinson’s remarks, see supra text accompanying notes 14–15.  For 
Posner’s commentary, see infra text at note 71.  From the moment the decision issued, both 
conservatives and progressives characterized Heller’s originalism as the expression of contemporary 
politics and, hence, as a form of living constitutionalism.  See Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key 
to DC Handgun Decision, HUMAN EVENTS, June 27, 2008, http://www.humanevents.com/ 
article.php?id=27229 (reporting that a member of the Cato Institute who helped argue Heller 
attributes both its result and its originalist reasoning to twentieth-century social movements: “The 5–4 
margin shows that Supreme Court appointments and Senate confirmations really do matter.  Had a 
President Mondale, Dukakis, Gore, or Kerry been appointing Justices, the result today would have 
been different, and the Second Amendment would have been nullified.”).  Progressive commentators 
on Balkinization struck this note as well.  See Sandy Levinson, Some Preliminary Reflections on Heller, 
BALKINIZATION, June 26, 2009, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/some-preliminary-reflections-
on-heller.html (“One of the most remarkable features of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion . . . and 
Justice Stevens’s dissent . . . is the view that the Second Amendment means only what it meant 
at the time of its proposal and ratification in 1789–91. . . . Both opinions exhibit the worst kind of 
‘law-office history,’ in which each side engages in shamelessly (and shamefully) selective readings 
of the historical record in order to support what one strongly suspects are pre-determined 
positions.”); Jack Rakove, Thoughts on Heller From a “Real Historian,” BALKINIZATION, June 27, 
2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-historian.html (observing that 
although they both rely on “originalist analysis,” “neither of the two main opinions in Heller would 
pass muster as serious historical writing”); Jack Balkin, “This Decision Will Cost American Lives”: A 
Note on Heller and the Living Constitution, BALKINIZATION, June 27, 2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2008/06/this-decision-will-cost-american-lives.html (“No matter how much the arguments in Boumediene 
and Heller are dressed up in originalist garb, they show us that that living constitutionalism is alive and 
well. . . . [T]he result in Heller would have been impossible without the success of the conservative 
movement and the work of the NRA and other social movement actors who, over a period of about 
35 years, succeeded in changing Americans’ minds about the meaning of the Second Amendment, 
and made what were previously off-the-wall arguments about the Constitution socially and politically 
respectable to political elites.  This is living constitutionalism in action.”). 
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A. Heller’s Justification for the Constitutional Right of Self-Defense—
Positive Law or Common Law? 
In Heller, the majority holds that the Second Amendment codifies the 
common law right of self defense.  The majority substantiates this claim, over 
the dissenters’ bitter objection that the Amendment did not concern “the 
right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and 
personal self-defense,”66 by modes of argument that are unusual for a decision 
that claims to enforce the understandings of the Second Amendment’s 
eighteenth-century ratifiers.  To establish that the Second Amendment 
codified the common law of self-defense, the Heller majority invokes sources 
ranging from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries.67  Though the 
majority presents these authorities as establishing the original public meaning 
of the Amendment’s text, their distance in time from the Amendment’s 
ratification raises the possibility that the majority may not be focused on recon-
structing the reasoning of the Amendment’s ratifiers, but instead on establishing 
the Amendment’s meaning through forms of reasoning conventionally 
associated with common law rather than positive law claims.68 
There is more evidence in the majority opinion establishing the 
existence of a common law right of self defense than there is demonstrating 
that such a right was constitutionalized by the Second Amendment’s 
eighteenth-century ratifiers.  Before Heller, historians of the founding era 
challenged the claim that this was the ratifiers’ purpose;69 since Heller, commen-
                                                                                                                            
 66. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 2822. 
 67. For examination of these features of Heller’s argument, see Siegel, supra note 3, at 196–98. 
 68. See id. at 198 (“Either the evidence the majority marshals to demonstrate that it was 
‘widely understood’ that the Second Amendment codified an individual right of self-defense 
accurately captures the understanding of those who ratified the amendment in 1791, or the majority 
is presenting as the original public meaning an understanding of the amendment that emerged in 
common law-like fashion in the decades after the amendment was ratified.”). 
 69. For historical accounts of the Second Amendment that emphasize its republican pedigree, 
see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 324 (2005) (observing that 
“Founding history confirms a republican reading of the Second Amendment, whose framers generally 
envisioned Minutemen bearing guns, not Daniel Boone gunning bears,” and noting that a military 
usage of arms similarly appears in state constitutions and the English Bill of Rights of 1689); SAUL 
CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN 
CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000).  These historians emphasize that the Second 
Amendment was responsive, not to the need for private self-defense, but rather to a deep fear of a 
standing army and the debate over how control over militias would be allocated between the federal 
and state government.  Rakove, supra, at 103.  Indeed, the first laws resembling contemporary gun 
control were not passed until after the War of 1812, well after ratification.  See CORNELL, supra, at 
142; see also Sanford Levinson, Guns and the Constitution: A Complex Relationship, 36 REV. AM. 
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tators, including Akhil Amar, have remarked on the evidentiary weakness 
of the majority’s case.70  For present purposes it suffices to observe that the 
Heller opinion goes about demonstrating the purposes and understandings of 
those who ratified the Second Amendment in what are at best methodologi-
cally irregular ways. 
The strange disjuncture between the majority’s theory of interpretation 
and temporal range of its evidence may be what has prompted the incredulity 
of several prominent conservative judges.  Shortly after the decision Judge 
Posner observed: 
The true springs of the Heller decision must be sought elsewhere than 
in the majority’s declared commitment to originalism.  The idea 
behind the decision—it is not articulated, of course, and perhaps not 
even consciously held—may simply be that turnabout is fair play.  
Liberal judges have used loose construction to expand constitutional 
prohibitions beyond any responsible construal of original meaning; and 
now it is the conservatives’ turn.71 
Judge Harvie Wilkinson was less understanding and offered the supreme 
conservative insult of likening the Heller decision to Roe v. Wade.72 
B. What Original Understanding Defines the Scope of the Right? 
To this point we have considered only the uneasy fit between the 
majority’s argument and evidence offered in support of its claim that the 
ratifiers of the Second Amendment codified the common law right of self-
defense.  As commentators observed as soon as the decision was handed 
down, the majority abandons even the pretense of reasoning from the 
                                                                                                                            
HIST. 1, 5 (2008) (observing that Saul Cornell’s work weakens the originalist case for an 
“‘individual, non-militia-related right to bear arms”). 
 70. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 
171 (2008) (“Justice Scalia cited no decisive historical evidence from the drafting or ratification of 
the Second Amendment that the Amendment aimed to protect the English common law right to 
have a weapon for personal self-defense.  The limited evidence from 1787 to 1791 in fact tends to cut 
the other way.”) (citation omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 14, at 255–57. 
 71. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.  Posner called loose construction the more truly originalist 
practice and one sometimes warranted by dead hand concerns, but he chastised Justice Scalia for 
employing it to judicially entrench the norms of the politically powerful.  Id. at 34 (“The proper time 
for using loose construction to enlarge constitutional restrictions on government action is when the 
group seeking the enlargement does not have good access to the political process to protect its 
interests, as abortion advocates, like gun advocates, did and do.”). 
 72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Wilkinson, supra note 15.  Posner initially drew this comparison.  
See Posner, supra note 71, at 34 (quoted supra note 71).  Cass Sunstein compared Heller to Griswold.  
See Sunstein, supra note 14. 
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ratifiers’ understandings when it explains the reach of the Second Amendment 
right it is recognizing:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”73 
The majority sanctions certain familiar forms of gun control regulation 
because they are familiar, reasoning from tradition and contemporary 
common sense, rather than original understanding. 
There is, of course, nothing wrong with reasoning in common law 
fashion or appealing to tradition and common sense; but acknowledging that 
the opinion depends on this form of reasoning locates the authority 
undergirding the judgment in the present, and in the discretion of the court.  
It is no longer credible to attribute the judgment to strike the District of 
Columbia’s hand gun ban to the eighteenth-century Americans who ratified 
the Second Amendment, as Justice Scalia does.74  Adam Winkler described the 
majority’s reasoning about the scope of the right as “living constitu-
tionalism.”75  Judge Wilkinson makes this point in the form of a conser-
vative slur: “The Constitution’s text,” he wrote, “has as little to say about 
restrictions on firearm ownership by felons as it does about the trimesters 
of pregnancy.”76 
C. Why Would an Originalist Exclude Protection for the Kinds  
of Weapons Best Suited to Vindicate the Amendment’s 
Republican Aims? 
Most remarkably, the majority goes out of its way to explain that 
regulation of military-style weapons will be permissible under Heller’s 
reasoning, insisting that the Second Amendment doesn’t protect “weapons 
that are most useful in military service,”77 even if it means that the right to 
                                                                                                                            
 73. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008). 
 74. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 75. See Adam Winkler, Justice Scalia’s Living Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST, June 27, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/justice-scalias-living-co_b_109728.html (“One of the 
most intriguing aspects of Justice Scalia’s opinion . . . is its use of living constitutionalism . . . . [W]hat 
explains the reasonable regulations that Scalia’s opinion recognizes?  America’s living tradition of the 
right to bear arms. . . . In the end, the list is a product of that lived experience and development of 
the right to bear arms, not originalist interpretive method.”). 
 76. Wilkinson, supra note 15, at 23. 
 77. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
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bear arms can no longer be exercised for the republican purpose of preventing 
tyranny that the text of the Second Amendment specifies.  While the majority 
and dissent disagree about whether the Amendment codifies the common 
law right of self-defense, the justices all agree that the Second Amendment 
was ratified to secure republican liberties.78  Yet the majority reaches out to 
explain that government can ban military-style weapons, without explaining 
why this constraint on the Second Amendment’s purpose is warranted.  Why 
would a court claiming to enforce the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment arrive at such a conclusion? 
Judge Posner thinks this aspect of the Heller decision reflects basic 
common sense and not the Second Amendment’s original meaning.79  Alan 
Gura, the lawyer for Heller, acknowledges as much, reasoning that, in order 
to win, he had to offer an argument to the Court that would enable it to hold 
that restrictions on automatic weapons were still constitutional—a position 
he defended in the gun community after oral argument.80  In embracing limits 
on the scope of the right, gun rights advocates were implicitly ceding ground 
to gun control advocates, whose case for incrementalist gun control 
regulation (such as the assault weapons ban) was immeasurably strengthened 
by militia activities of the 1990s—in particular Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.81 
                                                                                                                            
 78. See supra note 63 (quoting Heller majority). 
 79. See Posner, supra note 71, at 33 (“[T]he Framers and the ratifiers of the amendment 
probably did think that the right of militiamen to keep and bear arms entitled them to keep their 
weapons in their homes. . . . To use this ‘original’ understanding to allow members of the National 
Guard to store military weapons (machine guns, grenades, Hummers, and so on) would be 
preposterous, and it is disclaimed in the majority opinion.”). 
 80. In oral argument, Alan Gura, Heller’s lawyer, offered the Court a framework for allowing 
the regulation of military weapons—a limit on his claim he subsequently said was necessary to win 
the case.  See Brian Doherty, How the Second Amendment Was Restored: The Inside Story of How a 
Gang of Libertarian Lawyers Made Constitutional History, REASON, Dec. 2008, available at 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/129991.html: 
Many Internet gun-rights activists accused Gura of selling out on the machine gun issue.  
“We wanted to win,” Gura responds.  “And you win constitutional litigation by framing 
issues in as narrow a manner as possible.  I could not tell the justices honestly that I hadn’t 
thought about machine guns.  ‘Gee, I don’t know, maybe . . . ’  That’s a bunch of crap.  I 
would have lost credibility, it would have been obviously a lie and I’m not going to lie to 
the Court, and I would have lost the case.” 
Gura’s position was discussed at length in the gun rights community, where many seek constitutional 
protection for automatic weapons.  See, e.g., The Michael Bane Blog, http://michaelbane.blogspot.com/ 
2008/03/guras-response-on-machine-guns.html (Mar. 20, 2008, 11:17 AM); Sharp as a Marble, 
http://blog.robballen.com/archive/2008/03/20/Alan-Gura-on-machine-guns.aspx (Mar. 20, 
2008, 1:28:45 PM). 
 81. The Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people, was staged on the anniversary of 
the Battle of Lexington and Concord and the government’s raid on the militia compound in Waco, 
Texas, and was modeled on the FBI bombing recounted in the racialized gun control dystopia 
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Any or all of these accounts suggest that Heller’s restriction on military 
style weapons reflects the constraints of public opinion.  Other passages in 
Heller reason directly from popular conviction.  When Justice Scalia explains 
why he will not defer to stare decisis and interpret the Second Amendment as 
hundreds of federal judges before him, the Heller opinion appeals directly to 
history and to the beliefs of millions of mobilized Americans: 
As for the “hundreds of judges” who have relied on the view of the 
Second Amendment Justice Stevens claims we endorsed in Miller: If 
so, they overread Miller.  And their erroneous reliance upon an 
uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the reliance 
of millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown) upon 
the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.82 
History’s authority in this passage is not impersonal.  It reflects under-
standings around which people have built their lives.  Memory of this kind is 
living, and passionate, and, as Heller illustrates, the locus of contemporary 
constitutional conflict. 
III. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
The debates over originalism considered in Part I sharply differentiate 
between past and present.  Both originalists and their critics point to history as 
a constraint on the Constitution’s current interpreters.  Originalists celebrate 
the discipline history promises, while their critics protest the forms of dead 
hand control it threatens.  But in the practice of originalism examined in Part 
II, the past and present are no longer so sharply differentiated.  As Heller itself 
                                                                                                                            
depicted in the novel, The Turner Diaries.  See LOU MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN 
TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH & THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 108 (2001) (account of 
bombing based on interviews with McVeigh during the period of his incarceration); see also id. at 39 
(recounting influence of The Turner Diaries on McVeigh, which told the story of a “gun enthusiast 
who reacts to tighter firearms laws by making a truck bomb and destroying the FBI headquarters 
building in Washington” and which “suggests that blacks and Jews are inherently evil, and advocates 
killing them”); id. at 226–28 (recounting that McVeigh chose April 19 as the date of the Oklahoma 
City bombing because it was the 220th anniversary of the Battle at Lexington and Concord that 
began the American Revolution and because it was the second anniversary of the Waco raid, and 
that McVeigh prepared for his capture by taking with him to the bombing a collection of documents 
including a pamphlet on the militia movements of 1775, a copy of the Declaration of Independence, 
and a quote from the protagonist of The Turner Diaries).  For an account of the NRA’s involvement 
with the militias before and after Oklahoma City, see Siegel, supra note 3, at 230–31. 
 82. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815 n.24 (emphasis omitted).  In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the National Firearms Act, holding that “[i]n the 
absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than 
eighteen inches in length’ . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia . . . the Second Amendment [does not] guarantee[ ] the right to keep and bear such an 
instrument.”  Id. at 178 (no citation provided for internal quotation). 
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suggests, the memory of the founding era plays a central role in the ways 
Americans understand gun rights.  And as Heller so richly demonstrates, the 
struggle for authority to establish the meaning of a shared past structures 
conflicts over gun rights today. 
Even our brief encounter with Heller suggests several ways in which the 
past exerts authority that do not conform to the positivist lawmaking model 
common in originalism debates.  Claims about the past express contemporary 
identities, relationships, and concerns, and express deep normative convictions.  
As we have seen, some in the modern gun rights movement understand gun 
rights in classically republican terms, and have organized as militia to express 
estrangement from the state.83  Heller self-consciously disassociates the gun 
rights claim it recognizes from this anti-statist ethic when it holds that the 
Second Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”84 and excludes 
military-style weapons from the Second Amendment’s protection.  The 
Second Amendment that the majority recognizes is a law and order Second 
Amendment which honors and elevates the “law abiding citizen”85 over the 
criminal.  This understanding of the Second Amendment also reflects urgent 
contemporary concerns.  The movement seeking constitutional recognition 
of the right of self defense grew in response to twentieth-century developments, 
including the growth of the welfare state, the growth of crime, and the 
growth of a civil rights regime from which many Americans felt estranged.86 
When Charleton Heston assumed leadership of the NRA in the wake of 
the Oklahoma City bombing, he worked to guide the gun rights movement 
                                                                                                                            
 83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  For an in-depth analysis of the militia 
movement’s claims on the Second Amendment, see DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS 
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REPUBLIC 191–219 (2003); see also LANE CROTHERS, RAGE ON THE RIGHT: THE AMERICAN 
MILITIA MOVEMENT FROM RUBY RIDGE TO HOMELAND SECURITY 25–31 (2003). 
 84. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 84; infra text accompanying note 90. 
 86. See Siegel, supra note 3; id. at 240–41 (footnotes omitted): 
The mobilization of living Americans around the text and history of the Second 
Amendment did more than tutor popular and professional intuitions about the 
amendment’s core and peripheral purposes; it imbued the amendment with compelling 
contemporary social meaning by connecting the right to bear arms to some of the most 
divisive questions of late twentieth-century constitutional politics.  These debates made 
arguments for Second Amendment rights intelligible as arguments about guns, and much 
more.  Commonly, advocates asserted Second Amendment rights in a language of law and 
order that associated restoration of the constitutional order with restoration of the 
traditional social order. 
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away from the militia movement87 and paramilitary88 activity, and emphasized 
that the quest for recognition of Second Amendment rights was instead a 
“cultural war.”89  He appealed to the founders to bolster the identity of 
twentieth-century Americans who might feel ignored or threatened by 
contemporary constitutional politics: 
Our founders refused to ratify a constitution that didn’t protect 
individual liberties.  Maybe they’re just a bunch of wise, old, dead, 
white guys, but they meant what they said.  The Second Amendment 
isn’t about the National Guard or the police or any other government 
entity.  It is about law-abiding, private U.S. citizens, period.  You are of 
that same bloodline.  You are sons and daughters of the Boston tea-
spillers.90 
As Heston explained to an audience assembled at the conservative Free 
Congress Foundation in 1997: 
Rank-and-file Americans wake up every morning, increasingly bewildered 
and confused at why their views make them lesser citizens. . . . Heaven 
help the God-fearing, law-abiding, Caucasian, middle class, Protestant, 
or—even worse—Evangelical Christian, Midwest, or Southern, or—even 
worse—rural, apparently straight, or—even worse—admittedly 
heterosexual, gun-owning or—even worse—NRA-card-carrying, 
average working stiff, or—even worse—male working stiff, because not 
only don’t you count, you’re a downright obstacle to social 
progress. . . . That’s why you don’t raise your hand.  That’s how cultural 
war works.  And you are losing.91 
Heston’s speeches for the NRA illustrate how memories of the past can 
anchor expressions of collective identity, and so articulate deep social 
division.  Claims on the founding not only express contemporary concerns; 
they express contemporary conflicts.  After all, only five justices hold that the 
Second Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
                                                                                                                            
 87. Id. at 231–32 (“With Heston’s takeover, the NRA began visibly to cultivate a new, more 
family-friendly public image. . . . Heston gave the law-and-order Second Amendment a 
constitutional pedigree, emphasizing that the Second Amendment guaranteed Americans the ability 
to defend themselves against threats to liberty ‘whether it be King George’s Redcoats or today’s 
criminal predators,’ and spoke of gun ownership as a family ‘tradition’ that parents had a duty to 
teach their children.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 88. See id. at 232 (“In this period, some prominently positioned interpreters of the Second 
Amendment emphasized the forms of gun control the Constitution allowed, while others excluded 
from the amendment’s protection paramilitary activity.”). 
 89. See infra text accompanying note 91. 
 90. Siegel, supra note 3, at 232. 
 91. Id. at 233. 
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responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”92  Four justices 
dispute this claim at length.  The meaning of the historical record becomes a 
focal point for contemporary normative struggle.  And as all contemporary 
observers of the Court understand, the alignment of the justices in this 
interpretive dispute is not accidental. 
The day after Heller was decided, Dave Kopel, a policy analyst for the 
Cato Institute and one of three lawyers who assisted Alan Gura at oral 
argument, declared: 
The 5–4 margin shows that Supreme Court appointments and Senate 
confirmations really do matter.  Had a President Mondale, Dukakis, 
Gore, or Kerry been appointing Justices, the result today would have 
been different, and the Second Amendment would have been 
nullified. 
. . . . 
A second influence of the conservative and libertarian movements 
could be seen in the dissent authored by Justice Stevens. . . . Both 
Scalia and Stevens delve very deeply into 18th and 19th century 
sources on the meaning of words, and the original public 
understanding of the Second Amendment.  At least in terms of the 
Second Amendment, we are all originalists now.93 
As Kopel emphasizes, in Heller majority and dissent join in struggle over 
the historical record.  They agree about what counts as relevant authority, 
but then passionately dispute its meaning and contemporary implications.  
Kopel counts it as a success of the conservative movement that the dissenters 
express their claims about the Second Amendment through the history of its 
eighteenth-century ratification.94 
If Kopel is correct, then it is an index of the continuing strength of 
progressive constitutional movements that only a year earlier, the same block 
of the Court expressed its views about the constitutionality of race-conscious 
admissions as a claim about the history and meaning of Brown v. Board of 
Education.95  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1,96 conservative and liberal justices fought over the post-ratification 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment; neither side bothered to argue about 
the ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Chief Justice Roberts 
succinctly described the conflict in the case: “The parties and their amici 
                                                                                                                            
 92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008). 
 93. Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key to DC Handgun Decision, HUMAN EVENTS, June 
27, 2008, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 96. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown.”97  Roberts quoted 
Robert Carter’s argument for the plaintiffs in Brown, while Justice Thomas 
spent much of his concurring opinion arguing that the dissenters, who 
“[d]isfavor[ed] a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution . . . would give 
school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race—an 
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. 
Board”—with Justice Thomas urging that “[t]his approach is just as wrong 
today as it was a half-century ago.”98  Despite his avowed originalism, Justice 
Thomas derived his account of the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning 
from litigation of the mid-twentieth century, not the Amendment’s 
mid-nineteenth-century ratification.  Recall Kopel’s careful qualification: 
“At least in terms of the Second Amendment, we are all originalists now.”99 
There are striking similarities in the ways that historical evidence exerts 
authority in Parents Involved and Heller.  In each case, argument over past 
constitutional lawmaking supplies a locus for contemporary normative dispute.  
Leaders of the past are powerful icons of reverence, pride, and shame; the 
conflicts in which they engaged culminate in symbolic moments of 
reconciliation to which Americans today appeal.  Americans socialized into 
the constitutional order acquire this collective memory, wherever they were 
born.  Literate members of the constitutional order share allegiance to these 
collective memories and know how to speak through them, paradoxically, by 
disagreeing about their contemporary normative implications.  Collective 
memory of these kinds provides resources for Americans of very different 
normative views to make authoritative claims about who we are and what we 
owe one another.  Collective memory thus constitutes community and then 
supplies a language for its members to argue with one another about the 
community’s grounds and aims, enabling it to evolve in history. 
Looking back at Heller from the standpoint of Parents Involved, we can 
see that history matters in constitutional dispute, but often not in the ways 
presupposed by originalism in its positivist forms or by originalism’s dead 
hand critics.  The positivist, lawmaking model imagines constitutional 
lawmaking of the past as exerting controlling authority over the present.  
First-generation originalist theory offered no persuasive account of why or 
how the dead hand of the past should be endowed with this kind of author-
ity, and second-generation originalists are still revising the model to supply a 
better answer to this question.  But our examination of Heller suggests that 
                                                                                                                            
 97. Id. at 2767. 
 98. Id. at 2768. 
 99. Kopel, supra note 93. 
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originalism in practice does not conform to the positive law model that first-
generation originalists employed to describe and justify their method.  If 
Heller exemplifies original public meaning originalism, it is by demonstrating 
how the dead hand of the past can vindicate a living constitution, supplying 
resources through which a community expresses its identity and debates how 
it is to live together.100 
                                                                                                                            
 100. See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest, Gender and the Constitution From a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 297, 343 (2001): 
Considered from the standpoint of constitutional culture, then, history matters, but not for 
the reasons constitutional theory most commonly identifies: as a source of law or 
compulsion.  However much we venerate the Founders, we do not live under the 
Constitution as a regime of paternal authority, as the law of the father.  Rather, we live 
under the Constitution as “our” Constitution, as a framework in which we make decisions 
through which we are constituted and for which we are responsible, as a people.  On the 
latter account, the past exerts force, not as it binds our choices but as it informs our 
choices—as it guides them and gives them meaning.  We look to the past as we make 
pragmatic judgments about how to vindicate constitutional values in the present.  And we 
look to the past as we struggle to define ourselves as a nation acting in history, united 
imaginatively and ethically across generations as well as communities. 
